German Anti-tank Weapons, Techniques and Organisation in 1918
by Robert Robinson

Introduction

Although slow (and inhibited by already stretched industrial resources) in the development of tanks, by 1918 the Germany Army had, of necessity, developed a plethora of anti tank approaches. This article is intended to outline what these were.

The weapons

The K rounds
These were armour tipped bullets that could be fired from otherwise conventional infantry weapons. They had been developed to deal with armoured sniper positions and infantry shields well before the advent of the first tanks. Leaks about the French tank development programme had already caused an increase in both production and the issue of such ammunition, originally to designated marksmen. They proved relatively effective against the very thinly armoured Mk I British tanks and the French Schneider and St Chamond vehicles, especially when used at short range. They were lethal against the Mk IIs, that only had boiler plate, having something like a 50 percent chance of penetration. However by 1918 they were proving less effective when used against the relatively better armoured Mk IV, V and V*s except when used in heavy machine guns.

The anti-tank rifle
This is another weapon that was not originally developed for use against tanks. The German Mauser 13.1 mm anti tank rifle of 1918 (sometimes known as the T rifle) was in fact a militarised version of a pre WW1 elephant gun produced for big game hunters, ivory poachers and the like. Looking very much like an oversized infantry rifle this was a single shot weapon. At 120 yards it could penetrate 12mm thick armour plate if it hit it at right angles (dead on). However if the impact was angled or glancing the gun was much less effective. A round striking at 45 degrees would fail to penetrate 7 mm armour even from as close as 60 yards. No more than 20 rounds could be fired in succession before the barrel became too hot and had to be allowed to cool. Its biggest defects were its extremely heavy recoil (that could sometimes break a man’s shoulder) and its general size and weight. It was 5.5 feet long and weighed 37 pounds, without ammunition. Effectively a two man crew was required, one to carry and fire the gun and the second to lug the bulk of the ammunition (112 rounds). The second man also acted as a replacement firer when the primary gunner’s shoulder couldn’t take any more. Some guns were carried on light man pulled carts, this allowed more ammunition to be carried and the gun could be fired using the cart and its trail as a miniature gun carriage (saving a few bruised or broken shoulders).

These guns were originally issued in the ratio of two per infantry regiment but by the end of the war this had been increased to two per company. See also this page.

The anti-tank machine gun
In 1918 Germany was developing a 13mm multi purpose machinegun or light cannon that could be used as an aircraft gun, be mounted in tanks or serve as an infantry anti tank weapon. This was known as TUF (Tank und Flieger). The infantry version looked like a Maxim on steroids, right down to the wheeled carriage. Although it appears to have reached the prototype stage it is doubtful (but not impossible) that any reached the front. The Allies destroyed all the TUF anti tank machine guns in 1919.

Heavy machine guns
A number of standard infantry heavy machine guns were assigned as anti tank weapons. They used belts of K rounds. A German document of September 1918 shows that it was the intention that all heavy machine guns would be armed with K rounds and their priority changed from acting as anti infantry weapons to providing a defence against tanks. (Presumably light machine guns would have to shoulder most of the anti infantry role). Various divisional orders show that this policy was being implemented in some areas as early as August 1918.

The heavy machine gun could be fairly effective as an anti tank weapon as the kinetic effect of multiple hits in the same place could turn the armour red hot and soft allowing further rounds to penetrate.

Minenwerfer/light trench mortars
A revised wheeled carriage of the 7.58cm leichtes Minenwerfer n.A. was adopted in 1918 that allowed a flatter trajectory (and greater accuracy). The accurate range of these weapons was 500 metres. In September 1918 an instruction was issued to the effect that half of every battalion’s light trench mortars should be dedicated to anti tank work. The 192nd division of the German Army had already pioneered this approach in August. They proved very effective but limited by a shortage of horses for the transport of ammunition. During this trial British tank crews had described the use of light trench mortars in this role and from September onwards German light trench mortar crews reported that tank gunners were paying them particular and unwanted attention. With their relatively short range if operating in the mobile anti tank role (in the open) they were highly vulnerable to machine gun fire from tanks.

Specialised anti-tank artillery
The 3.7cm TAK Rheinmetall was a simple design intended to replace the Minewerfer/light trench mortars in the anti tank role. They had a lower profile than the latter but no greater range and would still have been vulnerable to counter fire. Some 600 had been issued by the end of the war but the number reaching the front and seeing action is unclear.

Field artillery
Initially each German division designated a section of its divisional artillery to act in the anti- tank role. In September 1918 an instruction was issued that stated that anti tank work was to be regarded as the primary role of ALL field guns! Steel pointed shells were issued. In the anti tank role field guns were frequently used to provide direct fire, sometimes over open sights. Whilst they could be very effective they were also frequently highly exposed. This proved to be especially the case once the RAF’s Sopwith Camel equipped ground attack squadrons took a hand.

Other guns
The German Army pressed almost anything relatively light and easily manhandled by infantry into anti tank service. This included various infantry support weapons including the Austro- Hungarian 7.5cm Gebirgskanone M15 (which was originally a mountain gun). These do not appear to have been very successful.

Flammenwerfer
Flame throwers were used against tanks but the degree and success of this is not known. The German back pack flamethrower had a short range and would have had to be used as an ambush weapon. The user would have little chance of survival if the tank was supported by others or by infantry squads.

Grenades
Infantry attacks on tanks at close quarters often used grenades. Single grenades made little impression and originally small sacks of grenades (usually using empty sand bags) provided a crude solution. These were difficult to use and by 1918 a neater solution was often adopted. This was to unscrew the heads from a number of "potato masher" grenades from their handles and tape or wire them around the head of a single complete grenade. The result could be lobbed (by a strong man) onto the roof of a tank or under a track, either would disable the tank. An identical solution was re-invented in 1942 for use against Soviet tanks. In both periods the lobber was in much danger from fire from supporting tanks or tank protection squads. Some use was made of tear gas grenades although so foul was the atmosphere inside Mk V's with their ill designed ventilation systems that one wonders to what extent the crews were affected.

Anti-tank mines
The original German anti tank mines were fairly crude improvisations being, typically, an artillery shell with its nose fuse removed and replaced with a cartridge case, a piece of wood with a nail driven through it was attached so that pressure would cause the nail to fire the percussion cap on the cartridge. The whole thing was sunk in a concealed pit over which a tank might drive. (In 1945 the Japanese produced an even simpler version – the pit being bigger and the plank and nail replaced by a soldier with a hammer). By 1918 purpose made anti tank mines were available. These were box shaped (14 x 16 x 2 inches) and weighed about 12 pounds. They were buried 10 inches below ground. The firing mechanism was based on that of a grenade and the mine could be set off by pressure from the tank (requiring about 900 pounds) or fired by a nearby observer - a bit like the IED's used by the insurgents in Iraq. Similar mines were still in use in 1945.

Aircraft
Although some successful (and semi successful) attacks were made by German aircraft on tanks there seems to have been little coordinated use of aircraft against tanks. The German CL and J classes of two seaters were primarily held in reserve to plug holes in the line made by Allied infantry advances. In any case by mid to late 1918 the Allies were gaining air superiority (although never supremacy) over the battlefields.  A crisis in the production of in line liquid cooled engines also meant that Germany could not produce enough aircraft of any type – let alone ground attack.

Techniques and tactics

Obstacles
The Germans made significant use of constructions such as trenches, anti tank ditches and concrete ‘dragons teeth’ to halt, trap or funnel tanks into anti tank ambushes.

One obvious anti tank tactic was to dig wider trenches that the tanks could not cross. However the British had built a replica of a typical section the German Hindenburg line. With the use of aerial photography this was kept up to date so that solutions to these could be found. In the case of the wider trenches this spawned fascines, cribs and the longer Mk V*s. The Germans widened the trenches further and the British fitted Mk V *s with fascines. There was a limit on how wide a trench could be before the increased vulnerability of its defenders to overhead artillery bursts, heavy mortars and air attack out weighed any advantages in improved defence against tanks.

The unmanned anti tank ditch was the alternative to the wide trench. Some of these were very much like enlarged versions of the ha ha  that often surrounded 18^th century stately homes in order to repulse the great unwashed peasantry and their livestock. These were much larger (what Terry Pratchet has called a ho ho).  Others were water filled (often utilising existing canals and streams). In practice effective air reconnaissance and pre attack briefings seemed to have rendered most of these mere inconveniences (they could also be in part nullified by a few large railway guns or other super heavy artillery blasting down and levelling out the sides). Such devices are only likely to be completely effective if one can deny one’s enemy free access by photo recce aircraft, by mid 1918 the Germans could no longer do this.

Tank Traps
These were used in some quantities and were much the same as those animal traps used to capture or kill big game. A large pit was dug, often filled with water, and covered with a light wood or thin metal covering. Earth was then laid thinly on the cover. More visible obstacles (for example piles of rocks) were sometimes placed to channel the tanks into the traps (this technique was also used to force tanks into mine fields). Tank traps had some success but being a static defence that took some time and effort  to prepare their effectiveness became much less once the Hindenburg line was breached.

Targeting tactics
Diagrams and tables were produced to guide German infantry on how to target tanks. The light trench mortars were to concentrate on the petrol tank and the tracks with the drivers cab as a secondary target. Antitank rifles and other weapons firing K rounds were to aim at specific areas behind which a crew member would be positioned, the driver being the prime target and machine gunners being second. Ordinary rifle fire was to be specifically aimed at vision slits. Grenades (in sacks or clusters) were to be used to blow off tracks.

Organisation

Tank killing squads
These were first organised on a somewhat ad hoc basis in 1917 but by 1918 most if not all infantry battalions on the western front had dedicated anti tank squads. Their task was to actively hunt tanks and they tended to operate where they would be most effective, that is in heavily trenched areas or in street fighting where there was cover to allow them to get near to their targets. They do not appear to have carried anti tank rifles but rather relied on using clustered grenades or demolition charges. Typical tactics appear to have used rifle and light machine gun fire against the vision slits to provide enough cover for ‘bombers’ to get close enough to lob a charge under the tracks. Big men were delegated for this task. However even when a tank was disabled it was still dangerous as it’s crew would usually continue to fight on as a pillbox or strong point until artillery could be targeted on to it.

Disposition of anti-tank weapons
By August 1918 the German Army had learnt that anti tank weapons widely dispersed and used in ‘penny packets’ were largely ineffective. The following organisation was adopted.

Anti tank rifles were positioned in the front trenches and just to their rear. They were in groups of between four and six.

Heavy machine guns and light trench mortars assigned to anti tank duties were not to be used singly but always positioned in groups of at least two. They were also to be positioned were two or more groups could provide each other with supporting fire. They were to be echeloned in depth behind the front line being concentrated where tank breakthroughs were most likely.

Field guns in anti tank role were placed in batteries between the front lines and the main artillery zone. They were placed where they would have a line of clear direct fire and, if possible, they could be concealed. In effect they were to be used as ambush weapons.

In addition anti tank forts were built at places that were thought to be particularly vulnerable to tank attack. Initially these had a mixture of weapons but increasingly each fort specialised in one weapon type so that there would be an anti tank rifle fort, a trench mortar fort, a field gun fort etc. Anti tank forts were well dug in and positioned so that groups of forts had overlapping fire zones.